In Africa, elections are widely accepted as the way to choose leaders. However, conducting credible elections that meet international standards remains a challenge in many African countries. Globally, free and fair elections are often marred by issues, as election credibility relies on not only the voting process but also the transparency of pre-and post-election activities.
When Election Management Bodies (EMBs) lack transparency, the entire electoral process is called into question, creating grounds for disputes and eventually electoral violence.
Despite progress in democratisation, elections in Africa often lead to instability and violence. Many African elections have been plagued by violence stemming from intimidation, threats, gerrymandering, perceived rigging, and brutality against opposition voters by security forces.
For instance, the elections in Nigeria (2011, 2015, 2019), Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2007), and Côte d’Ivoire (2010) all experienced significant violence.
According to Adolfo and others, in their 2012 report, electoral violence is a “coercive and deliberate strategy used by political actors, both incumbents and opposition parties, to further their interests or achieve specific goals in relation to an electoral contest.”
Similarly, Sisk (UNDP, 2009) defines electoral violence as “any act or threat of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm aimed at affecting the electoral process or arising from electoral competition.
Violence may be used to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll or to sway the outcome of an election or referendum.” Election-related violence may occur during campaigns, on voting days, or when results are announced, making security vital to a successful electoral process. The causes of this violence are linked to social, economic and political grievances or, at times, obsession with political power. These raise questions such as: are security forces equipped enough to handle election-related violence? How prepared are all political actors to play by the rules of the game? What are the consequences of electoral violence, especially on democratic consolidation?
Electoral violence is complex and can be attributed to many factors including structural, political and socioeconomic factors tied the loss of power, as well as factors related to the electoral process itself. Specific drivers of electoral violence include the pursuit of political power marked by greed, youth discount as a result as of poverty and unemployment, ethnic factors, inequalities and perceived unfairness on the part of EMBs, the judiciary and security, limited trust and perceptions of rigging.
Fear of losing elections can drive people to engage in violence to protect their livelihoods during elections.
A strong desire for power among candidates intensifies tensions in states where losing power brings socioeconomic insecurity, the likelihood of election-related violence rises, according to Adolfo and others.
Discontent in a state, especially where poverty and unemployment are pervasive in developing nations, can drive electoral violence. People, especially the youth, facing these hardships and generally discontent with the political system are easily used as catalysts for violence during elections. Thus, the youth bulge can be a strong factor for electoral violence.
Governance challenges are a cause of electoral violence in democracies in Africa. These include poor governance, divisive politics, informal patronage systems, and the “winner-takes-all” syndrome.
Governance structures that are weak perpetuate political exclusion, intolerance towards the opposition, the use of hate speech and injustice in the application of the law.
Additionally, mistrust in EMBs due to weak institutional frameworks can lead to further violence, as public confidence in the electoral process erodes. Once there is mistrust in EMBs, it is accumulative. Mistrust in the security agencies and judiciary can also lead to electoral violence.
It is, therefore, worrying that the recent Afrobarometer data shows a decline in trust of key institutions such as EMBs, the police and the judiciary, in some countries.
Electoral violence in Africa has emerged as a recurring issue, posing significant challenges to democratic stability and social cohesion. Electoral violence is shaped by the motives of various actors, the timing of incidents and the broader social, political and economic milieu within which elections occur. Understanding these characteristics can help inform strategies for managing and preventing such violence.
A key feature of electoral violence is the involvement of diverse actors. Political candidates and their supporters often play central roles in instigating and perpetrating violence, either directly or through third parties. Actors, especially political actors have vested interests in securing electoral victory. These outcomes (of victory) can sometimes be achieved through violence or the threat of it. This motivates these political actors to engage in or sponsor violent acts to influence the process.
Rhetoric and hate speech by political leaders, limited checks and imbalances within political systems, enable political actors to mobilise supporters, leading to counter mobilisations. Such involvement fosters a culture of violence that can become entrenched in political contestations, as seen in Ghana, where the rivalry between the two dominant political parties can escalate into violence.
One major motivation behind electoral violence is the attempt by any individual or entity to manipulate or influence the electoral processes and outcome to their advantage.
The stakes in elections are often higher and political actors view elections as an opportunity to control resources, power and influence. Consequently, political parties and their supporters may resort to violence to increase their chances of winning, especially where they perceive that their access to power is at risk. In Africa, where political power is often equated with economic advantage, such motivations are particularly strong. Additionally, broader grievances—such as economic inequality, political marginalisation, ethnic discrimination or dissatisfaction with political system can result in electoral violence as actors think that the only way to address electoral injustices is through violence.
The timing of electoral violence has implications for the democratic process. Electoral violence can occur at various stages of the electoral cycle – pre-election period, election day and post-election period. The pre-election period is often characterised by acts of intimidation and harassment aimed at disrupting voter registration or campaign activities. This stage sets the tone for the entrenchment of violence if not handled well and resolved. In the second stage, election day, violence is usually high and involves voter suppression, intimidation of voters to sway results, ballot-box snatching and stuffing and manipulation of results. The third stage, the post-election period, is often crucial, particularly when outcomes are disputed, and people see the electoral process to be unfair. This phase may lead to insecurity, destruction and deaths, as was seen in the Kenyan 2007 and Ivoirian 2010 elections, where post-election violence significantly impacted national stability and security.
Electoral violence in Africa has profound consequences, affecting not only the political landscape but also broader societal stability. It results in the loss of lives, destruction of property and a pervasive atmosphere of fear that undermines public confidence in democratic institutions. Importantly, electoral violence derails democratic progress by creating public disillusion and discontent with the political system. According to the Afrobarometer (2024), the preference for democratic rule in Africa has dwindled while preference for military rule has increased, partly due to disillusion with bad democratic governance and weak democratic institutions. Electoral violence deepen mistrust in democratic institutions such as EMBs, the security forces and judiciary further weakening them. This erosion of trust in democratic institutions is particularly concerning in Africa, as it undermines the very foundations of democratic governance.
Furthermore, the patterns of electoral violence reveal an entrenched cycle of instability. In many African contexts, violence is often concentrated in regions where poverty, unemployment, and social inequality are high. Disaffected youth, in particular, are frequently drawn into violence as they seek economic opportunities or social recognition. According to the youth bulge theory, countries with high youth populations and limited economic opportunities are especially prone to unrest. With limited prospects for legitimate employment, young people may view participation in election-related violence as a viable alternative for economic gain or social advancement.
In Ghana, the rivalry between the two main political parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), often drives this pattern, as both parties rely on youth mobilisation, which at times lead to violent confrontations.
To deal with the canker of electoral violence in Africa, the first step is reforms in the democratic and institutional set-up. The electoral system needs to be reformed starting from the mode of appointment of electoral officials to erase any doubt about their neutrality.
An independent EMB requires that electoral officials are appreciated as truly neutral and fair to all parties. When their appointments are completely isolated from the Executive and done by an independent body, the perennial perception of mistrust will be eroded.
EMBs must themselves endeavour to demonstrate transparency and fairness in the processes to engender trust by all parties.
Also, the security forces and judiciary must demonstrate neutrality and not be perceived as appendages of the ruling party or allies of the opposition parties.
Moreover, there should be consequences for political actors who perpetrate and incite violence. They must face punishment.
Lastly, democratic practice needs to be reformed and the winner-takes-all syndrome changed. Democracy must truly be people-centred and not seen to be enjoyed only by members of the ruling party. Getting to power must not be to favour the political elite and their cronies.
Anti-corruption agencies, the legislature, political think tanks and democratic institutions must all be independent and not perceived as promoting partisan interests.
In the last decade, Africa seem to have produced more democratic dictators and strong-men than real democrats. These democratic dictators and strong-men have no regard for democratic institutions and hide under democratic institutions for their personal aggrandisement.
Electoral violence poses a significant threat to Africa’s democratic systems and sustainable development. It is, therefore, an imperative for ruling governments, political parties, democratic institutions and citizens to work together in the public interest at all times.
All efforts should be made to settle major disagreements and differences at the table and not in the jungle.
GNA
